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SECURITIES REGULATION - SECURITIES COVERED
- SHARES IN COOPERATIVE HOUSING CORPORATION
AS SECURITIES UNDER THE FEDERAL SECURITIES ACTS.
United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975).
I. INTRODUCTION
Co-op City is located in the Bronx, New York, and is the largest
cooperative housing project in the United States The project was
conceived, built, and promoted by the United Housing Foundation
(UHF), a nonprofit corporation composed of housing cooperatives,
labor unions, and civic groups. 2  UHF organized Community Ser-
vices, Inc. (CSI) as a wholly-owned subsidiary and made CSI the
project's sales agent and general contractor.3  In addition, UHF
established Riverbay Corp. pursuant to New York's Mitchell-Lama
Act4 to own and operate the land and buildings of the project.
Riverbay subsequently employed a stock subscription, which made
the corporation eligible for state financial assistance,5 to raise the
capital necessary to finance the project. The Co-op City project is
thus a subsidized housing cooperative owned by the shareholders
of Riverbay Corp.
All tenants of Co-op City's residential units must be share-
holders of Riverbay. 6  The Riverbay stock owned by tenants can-
not be transferred to a nontenant, pledged, or otherwise encum-
bered. Riverbay by-laws provide that when a tenant wishes to
terminate his occupancy, he must first offer his stock to Riverbay
at its initial selling price. In the event Riverbay declines to re-
purchase the stock,7 the tenant-shareholder may attempt to sell
1. The project required 6 years to complete and provides housing for approxi-
mately 50,000 low- to middle-income individuals in 35 high-rise buildings and 236
town houses. United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 840
(1975).
2. UHF was organized pursuant to N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW
§§ 401-05 (McKinney 1970).
3. CSI was organized pursuant to N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §§ 401-04 (McKinney
1963).
4. N.Y. PRIV. Hous. FiN. LAW §§ 10-37 (McKinney 1962). Under the Act the
mutual corporation so established may borrow up to 95% of the cost of the project
at low interest from a state agency or municipality in order to construct housing for
persons of low income. Id. § 21.
5. Id. § 25.
6. A prospective tenant must purchase 18 shares of Riverbay stock, at a cost
of $25 per share, for each room desired. United Housing Foundation, Inc. v.
Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 842 (1975).
7. On the date of the Supreme Court's opinion, Riverbay had not refused to
repurchase any shares that were tendered. Id. at 842 n.6.
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elsewhere; however, he may not sell at a price higher than the
initial purchase price8 and may sell only to a prospective tenant who
meets the statutory income requirements.
Subsequent to the development's initial planning, Riverbay
circulated an Information Bulletin through the mails designed to
attract prospective tenant-shareholders. While the subscription
price stated in the Bulletin remained unchanged, 9 inflationary
pressures forced the average monthly assessments to increase in
excess of 70 percent above the figure estimated in the 1965 Infor-
mation Bulletin. 10 As a result of this increase, 57 residents sued
UHF, CSI, and Riverbay on behalf of all the residents of Co-op
City," alleging that the 1965 Bulletin falsely represented that CSI
would bear all subsequent cost increases due to such factors as
inflation, and that it failed to disclose other material facts. 2
Plaintiffs charged that defendants violated section 17(a) of the
Securities Act of 1933 (Securities Act), 3 section 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act), 4 and SEC rule
lOb-5. 5
The District Court for the Southern District of New York
granted defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter
8. The selling shareholder may also recapture his pro rata share of the
amortized mortgage during his period of ownership. N.Y. PRIv. Hous. FIN. LAW
§ 31-a (McKinney Supp. 1975). A tenant-shareholder does not pay rent during his
occupancy of a Co-op City residential unit. Instead, he is charged a monthly
assessment which represents a proportionate share of both mortgage amortiza-
tion and corporation operating expenses, based upon the size, location, and type of
unit occupied. United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 843
(1975).
9. The Bulletin estimated that the average monthly assessment would be
$23.02 per room. Id. Thus, the typical four-room apartment in Co-op City would
require a cash outlay of $1800 to purchase the requisite 72 shares of Riverbay stock,
plus an estimated monthly assessment of $92.08.
10. The increase was due primarily to a construction loan which cost $125
million more than the $250 million figure used in the 1965 Bulletin as a basis for
estimating costs. Id. at 844.
11. Also named as defendants were the individual directors of the corpora-
tions, the State of New York, and the New York Private Housing Agency. Id.
12. The tenant-shareholders claimed that the following material facts were
omitted: (I) UHF-sponsored and CSI-built projects under the Mitchell-Lama Act
had never adhered to original cost estimates; (2) defendants knew that the initial
cost estimate would not be followed in the Co-op City project; (3) CSI was a
wholly-owned subsidiary of UHF; (4) CSI's net worth was so small that it legally
could not have been held to complete the contract within the original cost estimates;
(5) the New York Housing Commissioner had waived his own liquidity requirements
when CSI was approved as contractor; and (6) there was an additional undis-
closed contract between CSI and Riverbay. Id. n.8.
13. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1970).
14. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970).
15. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1975).
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jurisdiction, holding that the shares of stock in question did not
fall within the definitions of a security contained in section 2(1) of
the Securities Act and section 3(a)(10) of the Exchange Act. 16
The court stated that even though the word "stock" is contained
within the definitional provisions of the Acts, the mere denomina-
tion of the shares in Riverbay as "stock" did not conclusively
render them securities for the purposes of the federal securities
laws. 17  The district court viewed "the fundamental nonprofit na-
ture of this transaction" as an insurmountable barrier to qualifica-
tion as a security transaction. The Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit reversed, finding that the Riverbay shares were securities
under alternative rationales.1 9  Since the shares were actually
characterized in the Co-op City Information Bulletin as stock, the
court of appeals reasoned that the securities laws were literally
applicable. 20  Alternatively, the court found that the relationship
fell within the "investment contract" language of section 2(l).21
Applying the traditional test for an investment contract,22 the court
held that the tenant-shareholders acquired an expectation of profits
derived from three sources: rental reductions made due to income
produced from on-site commercial facilities; tax deductions allow-
able for a tenant's pro rata share of the interest payment on the
16. Forman v. Community Servs., Inc., 366 F. Supp. 1117, 1120-21 (S.D.N.Y.
1973), rev'd, 500 F.2d 1246 (2d Cir. 1974), rev'd sub nor. United Housing Foundation
v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975).
Section 2(1) of the Securities Act provides in pertinent part: "[U]nless the
context otherwise requires-(1) The term 'security' means any note, stock, treasury
stock, bond, debenture, evidence of indebtedness . . investment contract...
or, in general, any interest or instrument commonly known as a 'security' .... "
15 U.S.C. § 77b(l) (1970).
Section 3(a)(10) of the Exchange Act provides in pertinent part: "[U]nless the
context requires otherwise-(10) the term 'security' means any note, stock, treasury
stock, bond, debenture . . . investment contract . . . or, in general, any instru-
ment commonly known as a 'security' . . . ." 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(I0) (1970).
Although the definitional sections of the Securities Act and the Exchange Act
do not coincide exactly, precedential authority construing one Act is equally
applicable to the other. Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 322, 335-36 (1967). Yet
full equivalence does not necessarily follow. For example, a broader interpretation
may be given when antifraud considerations are involved. See I A. BROMBERG,
SECURITIES LAW: FRAUD § 4.6(312), at 82.2 (1975). For a comparison of the
definitional provisions of the two Acts, see Hannan & Thomas, The Importance of
Economic Reality and Risk in Defining Federal Securities, 25 HASTINGS L.J. 219,
221 n.13 (1974).
17. Forman v. Community Servs., Inc., 366 F. Supp. at 1127.
18. Id. at 1128.
19. Forman v. Community Servs., Inc., 500 F.2d 1246 (2d Cir. 1974), rev'd
sub nom. United Housing Foundation v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975).
20. Id. at 1252.
21. Id.
22. For a discussion of the test, see note 69 infra and accompanying text.
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mortgage; and housing expense savings due to the substantially
lower costs of residential units in Co-op City compared with similar
nonsubsidized housing.
The Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit in United
24Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman. Justice Powell, speaking
for six members of the Court, stated that the substance rather
than the form of the transaction should control. The "any stock"
language of the Acts was discounted since no right existed in the
shareholders to receive dividends based on profit, the stock could
not be pleged or hypothecated, voting rights were not in proportion
to the number of shares owned, and the shares could not appreciate
in value.2 5  Addressing the respondents' alternative argument that
the shares came within the "investment contract" language of the
Acts, the Court pointed out that profits of the kind traditionally
associated with investment securities were not offered to them.
Specifically, the Court held that gain from rental reductions, tax
deductions, and housing expense savings did not constitute profit
26
expectation. In a vigorous dissent, Justice Brennan, speaking
for three members of the Court, found the reasoning of the Second
Circuit more persuasive. He indicated that he would have held
both the "stock" and "investment contract" language to have been
directly applicable.27
Forman involved the unique housing alternative known as the
21cooperative. Cooperative housing has been aptly described as the
"child of a marriage of a long-term lease with a stock certificate. '2 9
Even though this form of property ownership dates back to the
Civil War, it was never common. Indeed, it became virtually
extinct during the Depression.30 Only when the provision of the
23. 500 F.2d at 1254-55.
24. 421 U.S. 837 (1975).
25. Id. at 851.
26. Id. at 855-57.
27. Id. at 860-65.
28. The cooperative has been defined for the purposes of Federal Housing
Administration insurance as "a nonprofit . . . corporation . . . or trust, the per-
manent occupancy of the dwellings of which is restricted to members of such
corporation or to beneficiaries of such trust." National Housing Act, 12 U.S.C.
§ 1715(e)(a)(1) (1970). The Internal Revenue Code defines a cooperative housing
corporation as a corporation where "each of the stockholders . . . is entitled, solely
by reason of his ownership of stock in the corporation, to occupy for dwelling
purposes a house, or apartment in a building, owned or leased by such corporation
. .. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 216(b)(l)(B). Accord, N.Y. TAx LAW § 360(12)
(McKinney 1975).
29. Isaacs, "'To Buy or Not to Buy: That is the Question" ... What is a Co-
operative Apartment?, 13 RECORD OF N.Y.C.B.A. 203, 210 (1958).
30. See 2 P. ROHAN & M. RESKIN, COOPERATIVE HOUSING LAW AND PRAC-
TICE § 3A.02[1], at 3A-3 (1975).
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Internal Revenue Code allowing tenant-shareholders to deduct
their proportionate share of the cooperative's mortgage interest
expense was adopted did cooperative housing experience a re-
vival.3"
The vehicle commonly used to establish a cooperative housing
arrangement is the corporation. Once created, the corporation will
generally purchase land or an apartment building and enter into
the mortgage itself.3 2  Then shares of stock are allocated to each
apartment and sold to prospective tenants. Apartments are leased
to tenant-shareholders, who in turn elect a board of directors to
manage the property. It is the lease and not the stock which
creates the right of possession.3 3  The stock, however, is a neces-
sary prerequisite to entrance into the lease agreement, and there-
fore becomes the practical determinant of the right of possession.
A housing cooperative in its purest form is a joint venture by
many individuals working together to accomplish the goal of home
ownership.34 Yet, in practice the cooperative housing corporation
usually arises in one of two ways. In one, the owner of an existing
apartment building converts to a cooperative, thereby achieving a
result similar to the outright sale of the building. In the other, one
or more individuals construct a multi-unit building and then market
the structure as a cooperative.3 5 In either case the attempt to
provide cooperative ownership often takes the form of "an invest-
ment in a highly complex corporate enterprise whose purpose often
combines home ownership with profit, an investment where share-
holder-tenants are dependent on third parties not only to initiate
the venture but even to operate it for a substantial period of time
after they have moved into their apartments. 36  As a result, the
31. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 216. An additional potential tax advantage to the
tenant-shareholder is provided by allowing the deferral of recognition of capital gain
from the sale of a principal residence if the proceeds of the sale are invested in a new
residence. Cooperatives are specifically included as principal residences. Id. § 1034.
32. Cf text accompanying notes 4-5 supra. There is thus only one mortgage for
the entire project. This differs from the condominium form of community housing
where, since the resident is the owner in fee of the airspace between the common
walls, each individual unit usually will be mortgaged by its owner. The difference
results in a greater degree of interdependence among the residents of a cooperative,
and a greater possibility that a resident's entire investment may be lost if enough
other shareholders default on their monthly assessments. See 2 P. ROHAN & M.
RESKIN, supra note 30, § 2.0l[4][e], at 2-10. See also Isaacs, supra note 29, at 210.
33. 2 P. ROHAN & M. RESKIN, supra note 30, § 2.02[4], at 2-16.
34. See Miller, Cooperative Apartments: Real Estate or Securities, 45 BOSTON
U.L. REV. 465, 469 (1965).
35. See 2 P. ROHAN & M. REsKIN, supra note 30, § 2.02[2], at 2-14.
36. Miller, supra note 34, at 474. Once effective management by the tenants is
lost due to the large scale of the venture, the condominium form of ownership would
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potential for abuse is great. Typical examples of abuse include
binding management agreements made by a promoter to assure
himself a place on the board of directors for either a stated period
of time or as long as a certain percentage of the shares remain
unsold;37 "flip sales," whereby a promoter reaps windfall profits
by purchasing a building one day and transforming it into a co-op
the next, obtaining a greater aggregate price through co-opting
than through a straight sales transaction; 38 and underestimation
of shareholder costs in order to attract prospective tenants.39
Few states have adopted adequate measures to guard against
these abuses. The provision enacted by New York, for example,
provides little protection for tenant-shareholders due to its inade-
quate and incomplete disclosure requirements.4 0  Historically, land
sale agreements, especially noninstallment agreements, have not
fallen within the scope of state blue sky regulation unless specifically
included.41  Even when covered, the few state cases dealing with
cooperative housing projects provide little effective protection to
the tenant-shareholder. Where the primary motivation for the
purchase of the shares in the cooperative housing corporation is
"home ownership," the purchase is not primarily for profit ex-
pectation and therefore not subject to blue sky regulation.42
result in better organization. The characteristic of joint venture is lost and "realty in a
corporate mold" becomes more akin to an "investment in securities." Id. at 505. See
also Hoisington, Condominiums and the Corporate Securities Law, 14 HASTINGS
L.J. 241, 248-50 (1963).
37. See I L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 473 (2d ed. 1961).
38. See Note, Cooperative Housing Corporations and the Federal Securities
Laws, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 118, 120 (1971).
39. See, e.g., United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 844
(1975).
40. N.Y. GEN. BUs. LAW §§ 352-e to 352-j (McKinney 1968). For an analysis of
the New York statute, see Miller, supra note 34, at 486-89.
41. See 3 H. BLOOMENTHAL, SECURITIES AND FEDERAL CORPORATE LAW §
2.14, at 2-63 (1975); see, e.g., N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 352-e (McKinney 1968); N.Y.
REAL PROP. LAW § 339-ee (McKinney 1968).
42. See Miller, supra note 34, at 468. For example, in State v. Silberberg, 166
Ohio St. 101, 139 N.E.2d 342 (1956), cooperative apartments were sold to share-
holders. The Supreme Court of Ohio held that the Ohio Blue Sky Law specifically
exempted the sale of real estate and therefore the purchase in question was not
subject to state securities regulation. When juxtaposed with Justus v. Bowers, 167
Ohio St. 384, 148 N.E.2d 917 (1958), however, "an apparent inconsistency in view-
point . . . result[s] in uncertainty as to whether registration of stock in cooperative
apartment corporations is required in Ohio." Miller, supra, at 476. In Willmont v.
Tellone, 137 So.2d 610 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1962), sale of stock in a housing coopera-
tive was held not to violate the Florida Securities Act. The case is questionable au-
thority because it was decided in a conclusory fashion with little analysis.
Brothers v. McMahon, 351 Il. App. 321, 115 N.E.2d 116 (1953), held cooperative
housing shares outside the coverage of Illinois' Blue Sky legislation. However, the
case was decided prior to the Illinois Security Act of 1953, and the subsequent deci-
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Federal protection of tenant-shareholders has not been fully
developed. Although the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure
Act 43 has been applied to safeguard the public against fraud in
certain real estate unit sales,44 the Act is primarily directed toward
property-by-mail schemes.45  Given the limited scope of the Land
Sales Act, a more potent weapon for correcting abuses might be
available through application of federal securities laws. This
approach to the problem would present several advantages. 4 New
legislation would be unnecessary, since the disclosure provisions of
the federal securities laws are readily adaptable to the cooperative
situation. In addition, the present mode of enforcement is strong
enough to ensure compliance and provide an adequate remedy to
defrauded purchasers. Of course, the coextensive coverage of the
Land Sales Act would cause certain developers to face double
compliance requirements,47 thereby increasing dramatically the
costs of promotion and sale.48 Many developers, however, already
prepare similar materials either for their own purposes or to comply
49
with various state provisions.
sion in Sire Plan Portfolios, Inc. v. Carpentier, 8 Ill. App. 2d 354, 132 N.E.2d (1956),
impliedly overrules the Brothers decision.
43. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1701-20 (1970). For a discussion of the Act, see Coffey & Welch,
Federal Regulation of Land Sales: Full Disclosure Comes Down to Earth, 21 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 5 (1969).
44. See Berman & Stone, Federal Securities Law and the Sale of Condominiums,
Homes, and Homesites, 30 Bus. LAWYER 411, 412 (1975).
45. Legislative history indicates that the Land Sales Act was enacted to regulate
"an industry, ambitious and adolescent, actively engaged in marketing raw and semi-
developed subdivided land to the 'sunset set' by means of the mails, magazines,
newspapers, and personal or telephone solicitations." Coffey & Welch, supra note 43,
at 6.
The original bill envisioned a tough Act enforced by the SEC and was supported
by HEW, HUD, the FTC, and the Bureau of Land Management. "Despite such
support for SEC control ... strong lobbying pressure brought by the National As-
sociation of Real Estate Boards and the National Association of Home Builders
resulted in HUD control." Berman & Stone, supra note 44, at 427. The result is a
"relatively innocuous" statute, at least with respect to the problem of cooperative
housing abuses. Note, Cooperative Housing Corporations and the Federal Securities
Laws, 71 COLUM. L. REv. 118, 123 (1971).
46. Id.
47. The counterargument, though, is that the Securities Act of 1933 is primarily
concerned with the disclosure of facts concerning the issuer-developer, whereas the
Land Sales Act is aimed at disclosure of facts concerning the land being marketed.
They thus involve conflicting goals. 3 H. BLOOMENTHAL, SECURITIES AND FEDERAL
CORPORATE LAW § 2.14, at 2-63 to 2-64 (1975). This conflict may remain even
though the federal redress of fraud and misrepresentation provided under section 10
of the Exchange Act is virtually identical to that provided under section 1709 of the
Land Sales Act. See Berman & Stone, supra note 44, at 412 n.6.
48. Mofsky, Some Comments on the Expanding Definition of "Security", 27
U. MIAMI L. REv. 395, 396 (1973).
49. Coffey & Welch, supra note 43, at 20.
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The plaintiffs in Forman sought to invoke the protection of the
federal securities laws and avail themselves of the antifraud reme-
dies. These remedies, however, are accessible only when the
instruments involved meet the statutory definition of a security set
forth in the Acts. By deciding whether the Riverbay shares were
securities within the meaning of the Acts, the Court necessaril
decided whether the protection of the federal securities laws would
be extended to cooperative housing.
II. SECTION 2(l) SECURITIES: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
One major purpose of federal securities regulation is to protect
the investing 'public against fraud in the purchase or sale of cer-
tain investments.50 The method chosen to provide this protection
is disclosure, the theory being that the investor should retain the
freedom to make the investment decision whether good or bad, but
that all appropriate information to aid in the determination of value
should be made available to the investor and the marketplace.51
Structured information dissemination in the marketplace and the ac-
companying specter created by the various antifraud provisions of
the federal securities laws does not accompany all investment deci-
sions, however, since all investments do not fall within the defini-
tional provisions of section 2(l).52
50. The aim [of the Securities Act] is to prevent . . . exploitation of the
public by the sale of unsound, fraudulent, and worthless securities through
misrepresentation; to place adequate and true information before the in-
vestor; to protect honest enterprise, seeking capital by honest presentation,
against the competition afforded by dishonest securities offered to the public
through crooked promotion ...
S. REP. No. 47, 73d Cong., Ist Sess. 1 (1933). In the decade following World War 1,
$50 billion in new securities were floated in the United States; fully one-half proved
worthless when the Depression arrived. H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., Ist Sess. 2
(1933). It is little wonder that President Roosevelt stated in regard to the need for
securities regulation that "[w]hat we seek is a return to a clearer understanding of
the ancient truth that those who manage banks, corporations, and other agencies
handling or using other people's money are trustees acting for others." Message
of President Roosevelt, March 27, 1933, in I L. Loss, SECURITY REGULATION 127
(2d ed. 1961).
51. Most states have chosen merit regulation as an alternative approach to pro-
tect the investor. Merit regulation' entrusts a state agency with the responsibility of
analyzing the investment and passing judgment on its quality. The agency is given
the power to prevent the sale of any security not determined to be "fair, just, and
equitable." See Long, An Attempt to Return "Investment Contracts" to the Main-
stream of Securities Regulation, 24 OKLA. L. REV. 135, 159 (1971).
For an excellent treatment of the federal and state approaches, see generally
Cowett, Federal-State Relationships in Securities Regulation, 28 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 287 (1959).
52. Once an investment comes within the provisions of section 2(1), numerous
statutory requirements are triggered. In certain cases, exemptions from various
[Vol. 26:735
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Section 2(1) defines a security by the technique of enumeration,
spawning a method of analysis which tends to create pigeonholes
for the various instruments or transactions alleged to fall within the
purview of that section.53 Yet, the Supreme Court continually has
stated that economic realities are to govern the consideration of the
issue.54  This invitation by the Court has led numerous commen-
tators to develop other approaches to the problem of defining the
scope of section 2(1). 55  At the base of both the Court's statement
and the critical commentary lies an awareness of the pragmatic need
to consider the concept of a security in its own setting-the realm of
economics. Not only is economic theory enlightening, it is indeed
requirements are provided for in the Acts. For example, the two major exceptions
to the registration requirements are the private offering exemption, Securities Act
of 1933, § 4(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1970), and the intrastate offering exemption,
Securities Act of 1933, § 3(a) (11), 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(11) (1970). In private offerings
purchasers must have access to the kind of information that a registration statement
normally provides. See SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 125-26 (1953). Al-
though the intrastate offering exemption may be applicable in real estate transactions,
the great majority of cooperative housing corporations would be exempt from registra-
tion pursuant to SEC rule 235, 17 C.F.R. § 230.235 (1975) (promulgated pursuant to
section 3(b) of the Securities Act, which authorizes the SEC to exempt by regulation
defined classes of securities). Under this rule if the corporation engages in no business
or activity other than the owning or leasing of residential property (unless such
activity is incidental), if the corporation permits transfers of stock only in connection
with transfers of leases, and if the total value of the stock issued within any 12-month
period is less than $300,000, then the cooperative housing corporation is exempted
from registration. There is no exemption, however, from the antifraud provisions of
the Acts. Thus, even though the promoters of Co-op City were not required to file a
registration statement, defrauded tenant-shareholders alleged that the shares in Co-
op City were securities within the meaning of the Acts and that the antifraud provi-
sions of the federar securities laws applied. It has been suggested that the very
existence of the various exemptions demonstrates that the considerations bearing on
whether an investment is a security in the first instance are not coextensive with
those involved in requiring full disclosure or state administrative agency approval.
See Coffey, The Economic Realities of a "Security": Is There a More Meaningful
Formula?, 18 W. REs. L. REv. 367, 371-72 (1967).
53. This is true even though the Act was drafted "in sufficiently broad and general
terms so as to include within that definition the many types of instruments that in our
commercial world fall within the ordinary concept of a security." H.R. REP. No. 85,
73d Cong., Ist Sess. 11 (1933). The concept of a security for federal regulatory
purposes, however, was narrowed one year later. While the Securities Act included
a "certificate of interest in property, tangible or intangible" in the definitional
section, Securities Act of 1933, § 2(1), 48 Stat. 74 (1933), the 1934 amendments
deleted this phrase "as possibly involving too broad and uncertain application." H.R.
REP. No. 1838, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 39 (1934).
54. See, e.g., United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 848-49
(1974); Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967); SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328
U.S. 293, 298 (1946).
55. See, e.g., Coffey, The Economic Realities of a "Security" Is There a More
Meaningful Formula?, 18 W. Ras. L. REV. 367 (1967); Hannan & Thomas, The
Importance of Economic Reality and Risk in Defining Federal Securities, 25
HASTINGs L.J. 219 (1974).
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the most relevant nonlegal tool to assist in resolving the question,
"What is a security?"
The economist, who uses the terms "security" and "investment"
interchangeably, endorses an extremely broad notion of an invest-
ment.56 To lay the foundation for defining an investment, one must
start with the concept of wealth. The maximum amount of present
money one can obtain (the stock of one's present resources) is
economically defined as his wealth. 57  Wealth can either be present-
ly consumed to satisfy taste or devoted to nonconsumptive uses
which will produce wealth for consumption in the future.5 8 All
nonconsumptive uses of wealth are, economically speaking, invest-
ments. An investment constitutes a claim on (or the prospect of)
future consumptive opportunities or contributions to wealth and can
include not only real capital and financial assets, but also durable
goods.59 Each type of investment promises future consumptive op-
portunity appearing as part of the investor's wealth in a subsequent
period-a return. A durable good is thus included in the category
of economic investments because, even though it has an immediate
consumptive value, it will also make a future contribution to wealth
over its useful life.
All investments share one important characteristic: when pur-
chased, the buyer must attach a present value to the future or ex-
pected contributions of the good. In other words, the value of
what is not immediately consumed must be considered with respect
to the investment's expected return. If future contributions are
certain (the investment thereby being riskless), the valuation pro-
cess is less complex, and the present value of future consumptive
opportunities is discounted at the appropriate interest rate. The in-
terest rate is merely the rate at which the investor will trade present
consumption for future consumption. If, however, future contribu-
tions to wealth are uncertain (the investment thereby being risky),
the future consumptive opportunities will be capitalized at a rate
56. Professor Sharpe, for example, has stated: "In general, a security is a de-
cision affecting the future." W. SHARPE, PORTFOLIO THEORY AND CAPITAL MAR-
KETS 19 (1970).
57. Id. at 18.
58. In theory one can consume all of his wealth in any one period; in reality one
does not.
59. The totality of these decisions regarding future period choices is the in-
dividual's portfolio. An economic analysis of the portfolio will generally consider
only liquid investments. However, other assets which warrant particular attention
are durable consumer goods (homes, automobiles, and appliances) and human capital.
See E. FAMA & M. MILLER, THE THEORY OF FINANCE 250-53 (1972). For a detailed
treatment of portfolio analysis, see W. SHARPE, PORTFOLIO THEORY AND CAPITAL
MARKETS (1970).
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higher than a simple interest rate. Here the investor values by
quantifying the risk associated with the probability of an expected
future return.60  This valuation process may well lie at the root of
regulatory concern over certain types of securities. All future con-
tributions to wealth must be valued. This means that the investor
must have information about the investment to establish the timing
and amount of these contributions and to quantify the amount of
uncertainty or risk.
The valuation process and the type of information needed varies
with the investment valued. For example, valuation of a financial
asset can be distinguished from valuation of a durable good. When
an investor purchases a durable good, such as a house, he possesses
complete dominion and control over the good. The buyer not only
intends to engage in immediate consumption, but also to extract a
return from the house by capturing its future flow of contributions
to his wealth. Assuming no deflation, these contributions, at a
minimum, would be equivalent to the projected costs that the buyer
would otherwise have to incur for a similar dwelling. These costs
can be estimated without specialized disclosure. If the investor is
certain that he will have continued possession of the property, he
can be assured of a steady flow of contributions to his wealth in the
form of the future availability and enjoyment of the dwelling. The
risk involved in the flow turns on the investor's own knowledge
about himself. He must consider the degree to which he is likely
to conserve or neglect the house. If the house is purchased with an
eye toward future personal use, the investor will inspect the good in
60. All investmments, whether risky or riskless, are valued in the same manner.
When risky securities are valued, however, the process becomes more complex.
Valuation of a risky security is accomplished through the use of a statistical analysis
which quantifies data under risk and provides a rational procedure for optimization.
First, the most likely expected return must be established. This value is represented
by the weighted average of the set of all possible returns for a given investment, i.e.,
the sum of all possible values in the set of possible returns, weighed by their
frequency, divided by the number of values in that set. Next, variance from a set of
values is determined by taking the arithmetic mean, computing the deviation from
the mean to each value in the set, adding the squares of each deviation, and then
dividing the sum of those squares by the number of values in the set. The square
root of the variance is the standard deviation for the set of values. The higher the
value of the standard deviation, the greater the possibility that there will be a devia-
tion from the representative value. The value of future consumptive opportunities
offered by a particular investment is quantified by comparing the return (arithmetic
mean) with possible levels of risk (standard deviation) associated with that return.
C. HUBBARD & C. HAWKINS, THEORY OF VALUATION 1-57 (1969); W. SHARPE,
PORTFOLIO THEORY AND CAPITAL MARKETS 21-24 (1970).
As an alternative to statistical analysis, an intuitive approach may be used. The
investment is valued by using two summary measures - a predicted rate of return, or
best guess, and a measure of uncertainty with respect to that return. Id. at 20-21.
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its present state and determine its capacity to continue providing
consumptive opportunities, i.e., contributions to wealth in the future.
Moreover, if the investor possesses the durable good during its fu-
ture flow of wealth contributions, he will have the opportunity to
watch over it personally and protect its capacity to produce a future
return. Under this set of circumstances, the investor is capable of
making an informed valuation of future contributions to wealth
without structured information dissemination. Perhaps then there is
no need for the special regulation provided by the federal securities
laws.
To value a financial asset, on the other hand, the investor exam-
ines information provided by those seeking his capital and estimates
the amount of return. He must rely on balance sheets, income
statements, and other financial papers rather than on physical in-
spection of the asset. Moreover, the riskiness of the return will
be dependent upon the success or failure of the management prac-
tices of third parties. For example, when an investor purchases a
financial asset, such as stock in a corporation, the discretionary
management of the underlying asset pool is left to the corporation's
directors and officers. Future contributions to the investor's wealth
are contingent upon the managerial success of these corporate
fiduciaries. A similar situation exists in the purchase of a durable
good such as a house or apartment building when the investor sub-
sequently turns over control to third parties with the expectation
of receiving future contributions to wealth generated by the asset.
The need for structured information dissemination where valuation
is dependent on these characteristics is great.
It is postulated that there are two factors determinative to hold-
ing that a particular economic investment falls within section 2(1):
Whether there is a special need for data to make an informed and
sufficiently accurate valuation of future consumptive opportunities;
61
and whether the discretionary control of the underlying assets or
durable goods is outside the hands of the investor. The presence
of each of these factors tends to point to the existence of a section
2(1) security.
III. COOPERATIVE HOUSING UNDER Joiner AND Howey
The hybrid nature of shares in a cooperative housing corporation
presents a unique challenge to the viability of this suggested method
61. This article leaves to other commentators questions about the amount and
type of information which should be made available and the effectiveness of the
disclosure provisions of the federal securities laws.
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of defining a section 2(1) security. On the one hand, cooperative
shares are akin to other financial assets because they represent
ownership of stock in a corporate enterprise. On the other hand,
the right to enter into a lease with the cooperative corporation which
accompanies the purchase of its stock is similar to any purchase of
housing. It is an economic investment, to be sure, but one tradi-
tionally viewed as being outside the confines of section 2(1).
Rather than analyzing the investment in Riverbay by a more theo-
retical and fundamental method such as suggested here, the Court
in Forman chose the traditional approach suggested by other section
2(1) cases.
Plaintiffs in Forman alleged that the shares in Riverbay were in-
vestment contracts for the purpose of section 2(1). The term "in-
vestment contract" is not defined in the Acts and has been held to
cover a wide range of investment situations.62 In SEC v. C. M.
Joiner Leasing Corp.,63 the first Supreme Court case to consider
this question, the Court held the sale of assignments in oil leases
were investment contracts. Justice Jackson, speaking for the Court,
followed previous federal and state court decisions by not attempting
to define the term comprehensively. Rather, he examined only
the particular investment before the Court. Since "[t]he trading in
these documents had all the evils inherent in the securities trans-
actions which it was the aim of the Securities Acts to end, 64 the
Court concluded that the instruments fell within the investment con-
tract language of the Acts. The test proposed was merely the
"character" the instrument was given in commerce. 65  The Court
-thus committed itself to a liberal construction, one which it found
necessary in order to carry out the legislative purpose and intent
of the Acts.
This same liberal philosophy was reflected subsequently in SEC
v. W. J. Howey Co. 66  The investments at issue were units in a
62. The investment contract language of the statute has been held to include
such things as whiskey warehouse receipts, Glen-Arden Commodities, Inc. v. Costan-
tino, 493 F.2d 1027 (2d Cir. 1974); franchise and pyramid sales licenses, SEC v. Glenn
W. Turner Enterprises, Inc., 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 821 (1973);
discretionary commodity trading accounts, SEC v. Continental Commodities Corp.,
497 F.2d 516 (5th Cir. 1974), contra, Milnarik v. M-S Commodities, Inc., 457 F.2d
274 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 887 (1972); and charter country club member-
ships, Silver Hills Country Club v. Sobieski, 55 Cal. 2d 811, 361 P.2d 906, 13 Cal.
Rptr. 186 (1961) (applying California law, but reasoning pari materia with the federal
securities laws).
63. 320 U.S. 344 (1943).
64. Id. at 349.
65. Id. at 352-53.
66. 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
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Florida citrus grove development offered to the public. The units
were coupled with contracts for cultivation and marketing, the net
proceeds from operations to be remitted to the investor in propor-
tion to his investment. Justice Murphy, holding that the units
were section 2(1) securities, stated: "The statutory purpose of afford-
ing broad protection to investors is not to be thwarted by unrealistic
and irrelevant formulae. 67 Moreover, he added that emphasis must
be placed on the underlying economic realities of the transaction. 68
In contrast to Joiner, however, the Court established a four-part
test, holding that when "a person [1] invests his money [2] in a
common enterprise and [3] is led to expect profits [4] solely from
the efforts of the promoter or a third party," the investment is a
section 2(1) security.69 Although the Howey Court cautioned that
excessive reliance should not be placed on the test it established,
the Court's language has become the magic formula in state and fed-
eral courts. 70  No recent Supreme Court decision has clarified the
test or reconsidered its underlying policies. 7'
The Howey test can lead to various complications when slight
modifications are made in the investment scheme, placing it out-
side the reach of the Court's language.72 However, a strict reading
of the Court's language fails to recognize that the test was merely
a statement flowing from the specific facts of the case.73 While
67. Id. at 301.
68. Id. at 298.
69. Id. at 298-99. Some commentators consider the test to be a three-part
test, combining the third and fourth elements.
Justice Murphy indicated that this test was the foundation of the Joiner decision
and was consistent with other earlier federal and state decisions. This view, however,
has been challenged as not being adequately supported. In a detailed examination of
the state cases preceding Howey, Professor Long finds little support for Justice
Murphy's assertions. Long, supra note 51, at 148-55.
70. See Annot., 47 A.L.R.3d 1375, 1380-81 (1973).
71. See Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332 (1967); SEC v. United Benefit Life
Ins. Co., 387 U.S. 202 (1967); SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 65
(1959).
72. For example, pyramid sales schemes, founder-member contracts, and
franchise arrangements have been held not to be investment contracts, since in each
of these the investor performs some duties. In SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary Inc.,
365 F. Supp. 588 (N.D. Ga. 1973), the court explained such a result by stating:
[T]he Court of Appeals for this Circuit, as well as the Supreme Court, has
repeatedly stated the "solely" test as the standard for an investment con-
tract. This district court sees no freedom to coin a new, different and more
expansive standard in light of these binding higher court decisions.
Id. at 592. See, e.g., Beefy Trail, Inc. v. Beefy King Int'l, Inc., 348 F. Supp. 799, 805
(M.D. Fla. 1972); Gallion v. Alabama Mkt. Centers, Inc., 282 Ala. 679, 213 So.2d 841
(1968); Georgia Mkt. Centers, Inc. v. Fortson, 225 Ga. 854, 171 S.E.2d 620 (1969)
(de minimis efforts ignored); Bruner v. State, 463 S.W.2d 205 (Tex. Crim. App.
1970); Koscot Interplanetary, Inc. v. King, 452 S.W.2d 531 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970).
73. See Hannan & Thomas, supra note 55, at 236.
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those factual circumstances might have been typical, they certainly
were not unique. A mechanical application can be counterproduc-
tive to the acknowledged statutory policy of providing broad inves-
tor protection, 74 and fails to focus on the essential economic con-
siderations relevant to the identification of a section 2(1) security.
Indeed, it has been contended that no mechanical test should be
utilized in defining a security, because any test applied strictly
provides ingenious promoters with the opportunity to circumvent
the rule.75 This should not, however, prevent a rational and analyti-
cal approach from being formulated.76 Certainly, the synthesis of
a hard and fast test from the flexible principles stated in both
Joiner and Howey not only has permitted the ingenious promoter
to discover methods of circumvention, but also has forced the courts
to be nearly as clever in foiling obvious attempts to avoid regulation.
When the considerations posed by the Court in Howey are ap-
plied to shares in a cooperative housing project, the first two prongs
of the Court's test are met easily: it is clear that purchasers of
Riverbay shares invested money in a common enterprise.77 The
74. See Lino v. City Investing Co., 487 F.2d 689, 692 (3d Cir. 1973); SEC v.
Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, Inc., 474 F.2d 476, 482 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
821 (1973); Mitzner v. Cardet Int'l, Inc., 358 F. Supp. 1262, 1267 (N.D. Il1. 1973).
75. Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v. Hudson, 190 Ore. 458, 468, 226 P.2d 501, 505
(1951); Commonwealth ex rel. Pennsylvania Sec. Comm'n v. Consumers Research
Consultants, Inc., 414 Pa. 253, 255, 199 A.2d 428, 429 (1964).
76. Coffey, supra note 55, at 384 n.82. Professor Coffey defines a section 2(l)
security as:
(I) a transaction in which (2) a person ("buyer") furnishes value ("initial
value") to another ("seller"); and (3) a portion of initial value is subjected
to the risks of an enterprise, it being sufficient if - (a) part of initial value is
furnished for a proprietary interest in, or debt-holder claim against, the en-
terprise, or (b) any property received by the buyer is committed to use by
the enterprise, even though the buyer retains specific ownership of such
property whose present value is determined by taking into account the anti-
cipated but unrealized success of the enterprise; and (4) at the time of the
transaction, the buyer is not familiar with the operations of the enterprise or
does not receive the right to participate in the management of the enterprise;
and (5) the furnishing of initial value is induced by the seller's promises or
representations which give rise to a reasonable understanding that a valuable
benefit of some kind, over and above initial value, will accrue to the buyer as
a result of the operation of the enterprise.
Id. at 377.
Professor Long, in a similar vein, defines a security as "the investment of money
or money's worth including goods furnished and/or services performed in the risk
capital of a venture with the expectation of some benefit to the investor where the
investor has no direct control over the investment or policy decisions of the venture."
Long, Introduction to Symposium - Interpreting the Statutory Definition of a
Security: Some Pragmatic Considerations, 6 ST. MARY'S L.J. 96, 128 (1974).
77. Under one view, a common enterprise exists when the economic welfare of
both purchasers and promoters is "inextricably woven" together. Los Angeles
Trust Deed & Mortgage Exch. v. SEC, 285 F.2d 162, 172 (9th Cir. 1960). An alter-
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real problem lies in the application of the last two aspects of the
test-the expectation of profits7 solely from the efforts of promoters
or third parties.
While some courts have construed this aspect of the Howey
test strictly,79 others have expressed concern over viewing the
Court's language too narrowly. 80 Traditionally, profit has been
defined as the realization of gains. But, as one state court pointed
out, "[p]rofit does not necessarily mean a direct return by way of
dividends, interest, capital account, or salaries. A saving of ex-
pense which would otherwise necessarily be incurred is also a
profit to the person benefitted."8'  Indeed, the Court itself has
indicated that return promised for the use of an investor's capital
is not limited to a share of profits in the narrow accounting sense.
Appreciation in value, which is not a commercially recognized
profit, has been held to be the significant factor in finding a se-
curity.82 The important consideration should be framed in terms
of an expectation by the investor of some benefit over and above
his initial investment.
8 3
native view requires a "pooling" of investor funds. Milnarik v. M-S Commodities,
Inc., 457 F.2d 274, 278 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 887 (1972).
By either view, lack of expertise in the purchasers would be probative of whether
a common enterprise is in existence. Tew & Freedman, In Support of SEC v. W.J.
Howey Co.: A Critical Analysis of the Parameters of the Economic Relationship
Between an Issuer of Securities and the Securities Purchaser, 27 U. MIAMI L. REV.
407, 421 (1973).
78. The expectation must be that of the investor. But cf. Emery v. So-Soft of
Ohio, Inc., 94 Ohio L. Abs. 357, 366, 30 Ohio Ops. 2d 226, 231, 199 N.E.2d 120, 125
(Ohio Ct. App. 1964), holding that a security does not necessarily exist simply because
the investor expects profits.
79. See, e.g., SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 588, 590-92 (N.D.
Ga. 1973); Mr. Steak, Inc. v. River City Steak, Inc., 324 F. Supp. 640 642-46 (D. Colo.
1970), modified and affd, 460 F.2d 666 (10th Cir. 1972); Gallion v. Alabama Mkt.
Centers, Inc., 282 Ala. 679, 683-84, 213 So. 2d 841, 845-46 (1968); Bruner v. State,
463 S.W.2d 205, 214-15 (Tex. Crim. App. 1970); Koscot Interplanetary, Inc. v. King,
452 S.W.2d 531, 537-39 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970).
80. See, e.g., Andrews v. Blue, 489 F.2d 367, 375 (10th Cir. 1973); Lino v. City
Investing Co., 487 F.2d 689, 692 (3d Cir. 1973); SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enter-
prises, Inc., 474 F.2d 476, 482-83 (9th Cir.)., cert. denied, 414 U.S. 821 (1973);
Mitzner v. Cardet Int'l, Inc., 358 F. Supp. 1262, 1266-68 (N.D. II. 1973); cf. Nash &
Associates v. Lum's of Ohio, 484 F.2d 392, 394-95 (6th Cir. 1972).
81. State ex rel. Troy v. Lumbermen's Clinic, 186 Wash. 384, 394, 58 P.2d 812,
816 (1936); accord, Pine Grove Manor, Inc. v. Director of Taxation, 68 N.J. Super.
135, 145-52, 171 A.2d 676, 682-86 (App. Div. 1961); State ex reL Russell v. Sweeney,
153 Ohio St. 66, 72, 91 N.E.2d 13, 16 (1950).
82. Hannan & Thomas, supra note 55, at 238; see SEC v. United Benefit Life
Ins. Co., 387 U.S. 202 (1967); SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 65
(1959).
83. See Coffey, supra note 55, at 402.
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In Davenport v. United States,84 promoters offered potential
investors continuous employment in a proposed plywood cooperative
in return for their initial $1,000 investment. Affirming the convic-
tion of the defendants under section 17(a) of the Securities Act for
conspiracy to use the mails to defraud, the Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit impliedly held that the investment scheme fell
within the scope of section 2(1) in the first instance. Job security,
such as that offered in Davenport, is more akin to an economist's
view of profit than the traditional view that the benefit must be
received in cash or a cash equivalent.
Indirect economic benefit may arise in a cooperative housing
coporation when monetary surplus is accumulated. Rather than
distribute to the individual tenant-shareholders, the directors might
choose to use the surplus for the benefit of the entire housing com-
munity."5 Indeed, there is no question that the tenant-shareholder
receives economic benefits.8 6  It may, however, be contended that
economic benefit in the form of expense savings and special tax
treatment8 7 (1) should not by itself make an investment a section
2(1) security; 88 (2) is not the type of inducement central to the exis-
tence of a commercial profit;89 (3) is de minimis;90 (4) is beyond a
fair reading of the statutes and their legislative history;91 and (5)
is the benefit inherent in any form of home ownership.92  None-
theless, economic benefits exist in the cooperative housing situation.
While the majority in Forman reiterated the importance of
economic reality, it refused to recognize any expense savings or tax
benefits as profits under the Howey test. The dissenters took issue
with this conclusion. Discussing the benefits of subsidized housing,
Justice Brennan stated "[i]nvestors on Wall Street who . . .every-
day [utilize the efforts of others to obtain government subsidies]
will be surprised to learn that the benefits so obtained are not
considered profits. 9 Pointing out that the Second Circuit found
84. 260 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1958).
85. See State ex rel. Russell v. Sweeney, 153 Ohio St. 66, 91 N.E.2d 13 (1950).
86. Note, Cooperative Housing Corporations and the Federal Securities Laws,
71 COLum. L. REV. 118, 130 (1971).
87. In addition to those federal tax benefits discussed at note 28, supra, similar
deductions are often allowed under state statutes. See, e.g., N.Y. TAX LAW § 615
(McKinney Supp. 1975-76).
88. See 53 TEXAs L. REv. 623, 631 n.45 (1975).
89. See Berman & Stone, Federal Securities Law and the Sale of Condominiums,
Homes, and Homesites, 30 Bus. LAWYER 411, 422 (1975).
90. See Miller, Cooperative Apartments: Real Estate or Securities?, 45 BOSTON
U.L. REV. 465, 500 (1965).
91. See 53 TEXAS L. REv. 623, 630-31 (1975).
92. See 62 GEO. L. J. 1515, 1522 (1974).
93. 421 U.S. at 862 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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that the economic benefits were profits, 94 he asserted: "[T]he [ma-
jority] must surprise knowledgeable economists with its proposition
. . . that profits cannot assume forms other than appreciation of
capital and participation in earnings. 95
The treatment given to profits by the Court in Forman seems
to fly in the face of the Court's language that economic realities
are to govern. Economists from Adam Smith to John Stuart Mill
have viewed profits as residual income-the amount remaining in the
hands of the entrepreneur at the end of the period once all ex-
penses are paid. 96 Profit is only one of four categories of income
recognized by economists. The other categories are wages, the
return to labor; interest, the return to capital; and rent, the return
to land.97 Although profit occupies the final category of income,
it is not as easily defined as the others. 98 Opinions vary greatly.
For example, the late economist Joseph Schumpeter believed that
profit was the reward for innovation and enterprise. 99 Others see
profit as a monopoly return, whether contrived or the result of a
natural scarcity.'00 According to Marx, profit is simply all that
does not go to the worker. The prevailing view, however, is that
profits are surplus income, so that in order to find pure profit all
94. See note 23 supra and accompanying text.
In Pine Grove Manor, Inc. v. Director of Taxation, 68 N.J. Super. 135, 171 A.2d
676 (App. Div. 1961), involving four nonstock cooperative apartment corporations, the
court defined profit in terms of "profitable advantages that inure to [the co-op
owner's] benefit." Id. at 151, 171 A.2d at 685. Such advantages were held to include
low cost housing at lower-than-market prices made possible by government financ-
ing aid, tax deductions for real estate taxes and mortgage interest, and reduced
monthly charges from income accrued from vending machines, laundry machines,
and other nondwelling, on-premises facilities. Id. Similiarly, in Commonwealth v.
2101 Cooperative, Inc., 27 Pa. D. & C.2d 405 (C.P. 1961), affdper curiam, 408 Pa.
24, 183 A.2d 325 (1962), "profits" were held to be more than the actual receipt of
dividends. Also included were "pecuniary benefits in the form of reduced rentals,
patronage refunds . .. and other material benefits accru[ing] to defendant and its
shareholders." Id. at 409. Both of these cases dealt with tax issues and not securities
law. Nonetheless, the reasoning of the cases is analogous on a theoretical level.
95. 421 U.S. at 863 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
96. See E. WHITTAKER, A HISTORY OF ECONOMIC IDEAS 609-15 (1940).
97. These are incomes of a contractual nature. The entrepreneur's failure to
pay will result in a cause of action. Failure to "make" profits, however, will not re-
sult in any such contractual action. See W. KIEKHOFER, ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES,
PROBLEMS, AND POLICIES 581 (4th ed. 1951).
98. For a synopsis of the generally accepted views, see P. SAMUELSON,
ECONOMICS 618-26 (9th ed. 1973).
99. See G. BACH, ECONOMICS 435 (8th ed. 1974).
100. Successful innovation results in a temporary monopoly. Id. See also M.
BOWMAN & G. BACH, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS AND PUBLIC POLICY 545 (2d ed. 1949);
F. KNIGHT, THE ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 118-21 (1951), quoted in C. HARRISS,
SELECTED READINGS IN ECONOMICS 188-89 (2d ed. 1962).
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expenses, including implied ones, must be netted out. Items such
as interest, wages, and rents which are otherwise earnable but
not specifically charged asan expense by the enterprise must be
recognized as costs of production.'0 ' Once this adjustment is
made, the remaining surplus income is correctly defined as pure
profit. For this reason, it is impossible to "earn"f profits in the
accepted sense.
While the economist can attempt to define profit in this man-
ner, however, he has yet to explain its nature precisely. Hoping
to simplify the problem, economist Frank Knight proposed the
now generally accepted view that profit is the reward for risk.
0 2
Not all risks necessarily give rise to profits or, for that matter,
losses. A risk which can be insured against does not generate a
profit, since the factor of uncertainty can be eliminated by trans-
forming it into a constant element of expense. 0 3  From an eco-
nomic perspective, then, profits constitute surplus income arising
from the investor's assumption of a noninsurable risk.
The Joiner Court recognized this fundamental characteristic of
profit by isolating the element of "risk to initial value" when it
attempted to define a section 2(1) security. 10 4  While Howey may
be viewed as an expansion of Joiner, the Court instead may have
shifted the focus from risk to initial value to profit without fully
recognizing the implications of its holding.
In Silver Hills Country Club v. Sobieski,'05 the Supreme Court
of California, construing an analogous provision of California law,
rejected a strict reading of the Howey profit language and gave
judicial recognition to the economic notion of profit as it relates
to risk to initial value. At issue in the case was a transaction in
which investors had supplied capital in exchange for charter mem-
berships in a country club yet to be built. Justice Traynor stated
that the purpose of the California securities law was "to afford
those who risk their capital at least a fair chance of realizing their
I01. For example, a fair return to capital must be provided; otherwise, capital
will be withdrawn from the enterprise. The same result will occur regarding non-
waged workers and land used in the enterprise. See W. KIEKHOFER, ECONOMIC
PRINCIPLES, PROBLEMS, AND POLICIES 582-85 (4th ed. 1951).
102. F. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY, AND PROFIT 197-233 (1921). Risk-taking
is the raison d'etre of the entrepreneur; profits are his compensation. W. KIEKHOFER,
ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES, PROBLEMS, AND POLICIES 581 (4th ed. 1951). See also
J. HUBBARD, BASIC IDEAS OF ECONOMICS 289 (1953).
103. See C. MCCONNELL, ECONOMICS 575 (5th ed. 1972); M. BOWMAN & G.
BACH, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS AND PUBLIC POLICY 545 (2d ed. 1949).
104. See SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 349 (1943). The
theory itself predates even Joiner. See Long, supra note 51, at 169.
105. 55 Cal. 2d 811, 361 P.2d 906, 13 Cal. Rptr. 186 (1961).
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objectives in legitimate ventures whether or not they expect a return
on their capital in one form or another."'' 0 6  Rejecting the notion
that an interest in the assets or profits of a venture was crucial to
the existence of a security, he stated:
We have nothing here like the ordinary sale of a right to
use existing facilities. Petitioners are soliciting the risk
capital with which to develop a business for profit. The
purchaser's risk is not lessened merely because the interest
he purchases is labelled a membership. Only because he
risks his capital along with other purchasers can there be
any chance that the benefits of club membership will
materialize. 107
In essence, Silver Hills held that risk capital could not be raised
without the issuance of securities.
The risk capital test has met with some small degree of success
as an alternative to the Howey requirement of profit expectation. 8
It requires only that the investor contribute capital to finance or
operate an enterprise over which he exercises no managerial con-
trol. There is no requirement that a right to some present benefit
be created.' 0 9 The risk the investor takes is that his consideration
may dissipate to creditors prior to producing any benefit. His
capital must be employed successfully for any benefit to arise.
Often the benefit promised to the investor as an inducement is
merely the return of all or a specified portion of his investment at
a specific time-perhaps at the termination of the venture or enter-
prise. '"0
One advantage of risk capital analysis is that it allows the court
to focus on the degree of risk taken by the investor when ordinary
profits are not offered."' When profit is expected from an invest-
106. Id. at 815, 361 P.2d at 908-09, 13 Cal. Rptr. at 188-89.
107. Id. at 815, 361 P.2d at 908, 13 Cal. Rptr. at 188.
108. See, e.g., State ex ret. Park v. Glenn Turner Enterprises, Inc., 3 BLUE SKY
L. REP. 71,023, at 67,201-02 (Idaho Dist. Ct. 1972); State ex rel. Healy v. Consumer
Business Sys., 5 Ore. App. 19, 25-29, 482 P.2d 549, 552-54 (1971); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 71, § 2(20)(P) (Supp. 1975). But see L.H.M., Inc. v. Lewis, 371 F. Supp. 395,
397 (D.N.J. 1974).
109. See Long, The Naked Commodity Option Contract as a Security, 15 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 211, 255 (1973).
110. The benefit need not be material or tangible. For example, the right to use
facilities to be constructed in the future is intangible. Certainly, the benefit does
not have to be paid in money alone. See Long, supra note 51, at 167-69.
111. Risk capital analysis is not without its problems, however. Questions arise
whether the analysis should extend or be limited to capital necessary to finance
totally new ventures, risky, unproven ventures, or ventures offering less than a fair
chance of return. Mofsky, Some Comments on the Expanding Definition of "Se-
curity," 27 U. MIAMI L. REv. 395, 401-02 (1973). In addition, the use of a
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ment, both risk capital analysis and the Howey test with its profit
requirement will reach the same result. But, when venture capital
is solicited in a manner that shifts the risk of loss to the investor,
risk capital analysis will support the finding of a section 2(l) se-
curity, while Howey might not. Schemes with none of the general
characteristics of an investment, such as retail trading stamps, street
car tokens, or gift certificates, will not be characterized as securities
by either theory.1 12  All schemes with investment characteristics,
however, should receive uniform treatment. To accomplish this,
a more flexible approach to the Howey profit expectation require-
ment would seem to be mandated."
3
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court in Forman rejected risk capital
analysis. Confining consideration of this important issue to a foot-
note, Justice Powell stated:
Even if we were inclined to adopt such a "risk capital"
approach we would not apply it in the present case. Pur-
chasers of apartments in Co-op City take no risk in any
significant sense. If dissatisfied with their apartments,
they may recover their initial value in full.
Respondents assert that if Co-op City becomes bank-
rupt they stand to lose their whole investment. But in
view of the fact that the State has financed over 92% of the
cost of construction and carefully regulates the develop-
ment and operation of the project, bankruptcy in the normal
sense is an unrealistic possibility."
4
While the Court was not inclined to adopt a risk capital ap-
proach, some question still remains whether the Court carefully
considered this analytical tool. Justice Powell's statement evi-
mechanical test in the first instance can be troublesome. One danger in risk capital
analysis is a rather automatic application of the test whenever a valuable benefit is
expected. Such application would render all executory contracts investment con-
tracts, and thus section 2(l) securities. Benefit to the investor as an alternative to
profit expectation should be used as a test only where the proper risk capital setting
exists.
112. See Hannan & Thomas, supra note 55, at 247-48; Coffey, supra note 55, at
383, 399-401.
113. Professor Long proposes:
There is no indication anywhere that "investment contracts" possess some
special attributes which require them to be treated differently from other
forms of securities. Therefore it is time to abandon the rigid formula which
the courts have converted the Howey definition into ... and realize that
"investment contracts" are a tool to be used in securities regulation rather
than an obstacle to such regulation.
Long, supra note 55, at 177-78.
114. United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 857 n.23 (1975).
Justice Brennan had no occasion in his dissenting opinion to consider risk capital
analysis, since the cooperative shares were viewed as being securities under the
"stock" or "investment contract" provisions of the Acts. Id. at 866 n.5.
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dences the belief that a risk capital analysis is appropriate only
where there is some requisite level of risk-a threshold greater than
that attributable to the Riverbay shares. This view would fore-
close instruments such as federal government obligations from the
status of securities because, economically speaking, they are ex-
amples of classic riskless investments. While risk to initial value
"is the single most important economic characteristic which dis-
tinguishes a security from the universe of other transactions,"
it is not determinative." 5 In the process of valuation, the investor
compares various returns with their correlative risks." 6 The fact
that a particular investment has a low risk or is riskless does not
mean that structured information dissemination may not be neces-
sary to the valuation process.
The Forman majority's characterization of the riskiness of the
Riverbay shares is also questionable. While all former tenant-
shareholders of Co-op City were fully reimbursed by Riverbay for
their initial investment,' 7 the corporation was under no legal
obligation to repurchase any shares. In fact, the Mitchell-Lama Act
prohibits tenant-shareholders of a corporation organized under its
provisions from making any profit whatsoever on the sale of that
corporation's shares." 8  Thus, the investor faces a very real risk
of loss to initial value. If the corporation refuses to repurchase,
not only is the investor unable to realize any capital appreciation on
his investment, but he may be forced to sell his shares elsewhere
at a loss.
The Court also added the troubling statement that "the risk of
insolvency of an ongoing housing cooperative 'differ[s] vastly'
from the kind of risk of 'fluctuating' value associated with securities
investments." " 9 While fluctuation in value is a characteristic of
most shares of stock, it is of little consequence with respect to other
investments. Certainly, the quantification of riskiness in the pro-
cess of valuing a security cannot be limited to a consideration of
the risk of fluctuation in value. Risk of loss from insolvency must
also be considered. The presence of fluctuation in value is not a
characteristic sufficient to distinguish section 2(1) securities from all
other investments. Instruments held to be section 2(1) securities
115. Coffey, supra note 55, at 375.
116. See note 60 supra and accompanying text.
117. 421 U.S. at 842 n.6.
118. N.Y. PRIV. Hous. FIN. LAW § 31-a (McKinney Supp. 1975).
119. 421 U.S. at 857 n.4, citing SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S.
65, 90-91 (1959) (Brennan, J., concurring).
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in both Joiner and Howey could not be characterized as tied to a
risk of fluctuating value; however, they did fall within section 2(1).
Profits may be difficult to isolate in many investment situa-
tions, and basing the finding of a section 2(1) security on a search
for profits or profit expectations can only confuse the issue in some
cases. Instead, it is easier to start with an examination of the value
paid by the buyer. If the consideration given represents more than
the present consumptive value received, then it can be presumed
that the transaction has investment qualities. Once this has been
established, a court might examine the character of the invest-
ment to determine whether there is a specialized need for struc-
tured information dissemination in the valuation process. This
approach would eliminate many of the problems raised by the
application of the profit expectation language of the Howey test.
Indeed, the Howey Court itself stated that "the statutory policy of
affording broad protection for investors is not to be thwarted by
unrealistic and irrelevant formulae."
1 20
The second part of the Howey test which has caused difficulties
with its application is the "solely from the efforts of [others]"
language.12 1  A strict reading of the language would create absurd
results. In the Howey case itself, for example, if investors had
been required to pick one orange, the instruments would no longer
meet the Court's test. The Supreme Court of Hawaii has stated
an alternative standard in State v. Hawaii Market Centers, Inc. 22
Holding that founder-member arrangements fell within the Hawaii
Blue Sky Law, the court focused on the quality of participation by
the investors. This reading of the Howey test tempered the other-
wise harsh consequences that would have resulted from a strict
interpretation.
The most recent interpretation of this prong of the Howey test
was expressed subsequently in SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises,
Inc.,23 a case involving a pyramid sales scheme. The Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that self-improvement contracts
offered in exchange for the opportunity to earn commissions on the
120. 328 U.S. at 301.
121. There are two possible explanations for the Howey Court's inclusion of the
word "solely." It may have been included deliberately as a specific element of the
test. Alternatively it may have been a manifestation of the specific factual circum-
stances in the case and added without intending to restrict consideration of the
economic realities. Regardless of the proper explanation, "solely" has been read as a
specific requirement. No case since 1970, however, has followed a strictly literal
application. Long, Partnership, Limited Partnership, and Joint Venture Interests as
Securities, 37 Mo. L. REv. 581, 602 (1972).
122. 52 Hawaii 642, 485 P.2d 105 (1971).
123. 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 821 (1973).
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sale of similar contracts to others were investment contracts. 124
Believing that adherence to a strict interpretation would result in
"a mechanical, unduly restrictive view of what is and what is not an
investment contract,"'125 the Ninth Circuit found that a strict appli-
cation of Howey was contrary to the broad purposes of the Act,
and that it carried the potential for creating loopholes:
[W]e adopt a more realistic test, whether the efforts made
by those other than the investor are the undeniably signif-
icant ones, those essential managerial efforts which affect
the failure or success of the enterprise.
Our holding in this case represents no major attempt to
redefine the essential nature of a security. Nor does our
holding represent any real departure from the Supreme
Court's definition of an investment contract as set out in
Howey. We hold only that the requirement that profits
come "solely" from the efforts of others would, in circum-
stances such as these, lead to unrealistic results if applied
dogmatically, and that a more flexible approach is appro-
priate.1
21
The underlying assumption in Turner is that the presence of ef-
forts other than essential managerial efforts is insignificant. This
consideration is important in the context of the cooperative housing
corporation. The corporate form provides the shareholder with the
right to control those who contribute essential managerial efforts.
A shareholder participates in the election of directors. But the right
to control others should be distinguished from the actual contribu-
tion of essential managerial efforts by the investor. In most co-
operative corporations, the individual investor in fact does not per-
sonally contribute essential managerial efforts. Certainly this is true
in developments such as Co-op City, and would be true to an even
greater extent in developer-initiated cooperatives where the pro-
moter maintains control of the management function. Yet, where
the number of investors is small, control could be equated with
contribution of essential managerial efforts. Nevertheless, the
124. Id. at 482.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 482-83 (emphasis added). This language has met with increasing
judicial approval. See, e.g., Miller v. Central Chinchilla Group, Inc., [1973-74
Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. $ 94,465, at 95,638 (8th Cir. 1974);
Andrews v. Blue, 489 F.2d 367, 375 (10th Cir. 1973); Lino v. City Investing Co., 487
F.2d 689, 692 (3d Cir. 1973); Mitzner v. Cardet Int'l, Inc., 358 F. Supp. 1262, 1266-
68 (N.D. Ill. 1973). See also Continental Marketing Corp. v. SEC, 387 F.2d 466,
470 (10th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 905 (1968). But see 27 U. MIAmI L.
REv. 487, 493 (1973).
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mere right to control should not be determinative. While neither
Turner nor Forman consider this problem, it should be noted.
1 27
IV. COOPERATIVE HOUSING SHARES AS FINANCIAL ASSETS
Because the Riverbay shares are shares of stock in a corpora-
tion, they take on many of the attributes of other financial invest-
ments. Plaintiffs in Forman sought to call upon the financial as-
set characteristics of the cooperative shares by alleging that they
fell within the "any stock" language of section 2(1). The plain-
meaning concept of statutory construction would seem to mandate
treatment of Co-op City shares as section 2(1) securities, since the
word "stock" is specifically included in the definition and since the
shares were called stock by the issuer.1 28 In Joiner, the Court said:
"Instruments may be included within [section 2(l)], as a matter of
law, if on their face they answer to the name or description."
129
This language implies that the federal securities law literally apply
to schemes where a stock corporation is used, regardless of the pres-
ence of a profit motivation. 30 All shares of corporate stock represent
a proprietary ownership interest in the asset pool of the corpora-
tion, and for regulatory purposes, the fact that the issuer is a co-
operative housing corporation should not be altogether determina-
tive.'3 '
Here, too, the Forman Court rejected a literal reading of the
127. Professor Long proposes that the Howey "solely through the efforts of others"
test should be changed to read "where the investor has no direct control over the
investment or policy decisions of the venture." Long, Introduction to Symposium
- Interpreting the Statutory Definition of a Security: Some Pragmatic Considerations,
6 ST. MARY'S L.J. 96, 122 (1974).
128. United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 843 (1975); see
Sobieski, Securities Regulation in California: Recent Developments, 11 U.C.L.A.L.
REV. 1, 7-8 (1963); Note, Cooperative Housing Corporations and the Federal Secur-
ities Laws, 71 COLUM. L. REv. 118, 127 (1971).
129. 320 U.S. at 351. In Movielab, Inc. v. Berkey Photo, Inc., 321 F. Supp. 806,
808-09 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), affidper curiam, 452 F.2d 662 (2d Cir. 1971), the court held
that courts do not have the discretion to exclude instruments from the Securities Acts.
The Second Circuit, however, chose to affirm on a narrower ground - that the particular
notes in question were themselves securities. See generally cases cited at note 133
infra.
130. R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, SECURITIES REGULATION 300 (3d ed. 1970).
131. 1 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 492-93 (2d ed. 1961). Commentators
have indicated that "[p]roprietary leases in stock cooperative apartment projects
which are sold coupled with shares of stock in the property owning corporation have
long been treated as securities." Wenig & Schulz, Government Regulation of Con-
dominium in California, 14 HASTINGS L.J. 222, 233 (1963). This statement, however,
was made with respect to section 25008 of the California Corporation Code, which holds
that securities include "stock," and certainly is not controlling with respect to federal
securities regulation.
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statute.132 Noting that the primary focus of the Acts is "the capital
market of the enterprise system," the Court held that the economic
realities of the transaction, not merely the name given to the in-
struments, should govern.13 3  The Court distinguished Joiner134 by
noting that the language of that opinion precluded any indication
that the Court intended to establish a mechanical rule.1 35  Shares
in a cooperative housing corporation are merely mechanical inci-
dents to the sale of an interest in real estate.1 36  Forman distin-
guished cooperative housing corporations from general business
corporations, where individuals invest with the sole purpose of mak-
ing a profit and where consumptive characteristics are not domi-
nant. 
1 37
Drawing a distinction between shares in a cooperative housing
corporation and the shares in a general business corporation pre-
sents some conceptual problems. Both situations encompass the
corporate form whether or not tangible income is generated. The
cooperative housing corporation is conceptually no different from
any other corporation. It has many of the characteristics commonly
attributable to the corporate entity, even though there generally
will be one class of stock and limits will be placed on the trans-
ferability of those shares. 38  For example, each shareholder "owns"
132. 421 U.S. at 848.
133. Id. at 848-49; accord, Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967); SEC
v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298 (1946).
An "economic realities" approach would seem to be required by the introductory
phrase "unless the context otherwise requires" in section 2(1). The phrase might be
interpreted to mean that "securities" include all the listed investments, e.g., stock
and investment contracts, unless some other specific portion of the Acts provided a
different definition for a special purpose. The better reading is that the phrase
represents a recognition of the principle that the context surrounding the investment,
and not the name given to the investment, is crucial. This latter view has been
adopted by the courts. Thus, although promissory notes are enumerated in section
2(1), certain notes have been held to be outside the statute where there has been no
public offering or procurement for speculation or investment. See, e.g., Lino v. City
Investing Co., 487 F.2d 689 (3d. Cir. 1973); McClure v. First Nat'l Bank, 352 F. Supp.
454 (N.D. Tex. 1973); Joseph v. Norman's Health Club, Inc., 336 F. Supp. 307 (E.D.
Mo. 1971).
134. See text accompanying note 129 supra.
135. "By using the conditional words 'may' and 'might' in these dicta the [joiner]
Court made clear that it was not establishing an inflexible rule barring inquiry into
the economic realities underlying a transaction." United Housing Foundation, Inc. v.
Forman, 421 U.S. at 850.
136. "[J]ust as some things which look like real estate are securities, some things
which look like securities are real estate." I L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 493
(2d ed. 1961).
137. See text accompanying notes 50-51 supra.
138. Stock transfer restrictions are valid so long as they are adopted for a lawful
purpose and do not act as an unreasonable restraint on the alienability of the shares.
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the cooperative corporation and holds a proportionate interest in
its earnings and net assets upon liquidation.1 39  The number of
shares held not only entitles the shareholder to a proprietary lease
executed in his favor, but also determines the owner's share of
expenses, rights upon dissolution or liquidation, and in some cases
the weight of his vote at corporation meetings.1 40  Each shareholder
also possesses three primary rights: (1) the right to expel manage-
ment in conjunction with other shareholders; (2) the right to sue
management for misuse of power, gross mismanagement, fraud, or
dishonesty; and (3) the right to sell his shares. 14' In addition,
each shareholder elects with others a board of directors who manage
the cooperative property.
These similarities were recognized in 1050 Tenants Corp. v.
Jakobson. 42  In that case, plaintiffs brought a class action on be-
half of all past and present shareholders of 1050 Tenants Corp.,
a cooperative, alleging that the defendant promoters violated various
antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws. The Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of
defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
The Second Circuit found that shares in 1050 Corp. were both
"stock" and "investment contracts" under the definitional lan-
guage of the Acts. I43 The corporation in Jakobson was organized
under New York's Business Corporation Law, whereas Riverbay
was organized under the New York Private Housing Finance Law.
Although it could be said that Jakobson is now of questionable
authority, having been decided prior to Forman, a similar result
was reached subsequently by the court in Grenader v. Spitz.
44
After reciting the holding in Forman, the district court distinguished
the shares in the cooperative corporation and found that these shares
were more akin to traditional shares of stock than the Riverbay
shares. Specifically, the court stated that the shares were sold at
Thus, consent restrictions in the cooperative corporation have been upheld by analogy
to lease provisions prohibiting assignment of the leashold interest without consent.
H. HENN, THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS 552-54 (2d ed. 1970).
One further variation is that funds are paid over to the cooperative corporation
for the comparatively immediate return of recognized property rights and benefits.
These rights otherwise would be purchased. Hoisington, Condominiums and the
Corporate Securities Law, 14 HASTINGS L.J. 241, 253 (1963).
139. H. HENN, supra note 138, at 289; see id. at 252-53.
140. 2 P. ROHAN & M. RESKIN, COOPERATIVE HOUSING LAW AND PRACTICE
§ 2.02[5][f], at 2-21 (1975).
141. See J. LIVINGSTON, THE AMERICAN STOCKHOLDER 40-41 (1958).
142. 365 F. Supp. 1171 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), aff'd, 503 F.2d 1375 (2d Cir. 1974).
143. 503 F.2d at 1378.
144. CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 95,300 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 1975). But see note
151 infra.
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a profit, that voting rights were determined in proportion to the
number of shares owned, and that the shares could be transferred
more easily than the Riverbay shares.1 45 Thus, even after Forman,
the issue of whether shares of stock in a cooperative housing cor-
poration are securities for purposes of the federal securities laws is
still not completely settled.
V. CONCLUSION
Forman decided whether shares in a cooperative corporation
fell within either the "stock" or "investment contract" language of
section 2(l) of the Securities Act, but the Court's treatment of the
issue was less than satisfactory. Approaching the initial question,
whether the Riverbay shares were stock for the purpose of section
2(1), the majority stated that economic realities were of major con-
cern, yet they chose to ignore the fact that the issuer of the shares
was a corporate entity. Likewise, the Court rejected a more eco-
nomically sound investment contract analysis in favor of a rigid
application of a test originally formulated to overcome "irrelevant
formulae." Nevertheless, the Forman Court's failure to conclude
that section 2(1) securities were issued by Riverbay may be attrib-
utable to its conclusion that the "inducement to purchase was solely
to acquire subsidized low-cost housing space . . . not to invest for
profit."'146  At least one court has characterized this type of reason-
ing as an engagement "in the type of mind-probing speculation . . .
[which is] unhelpful and unnecessary."' 147 It indicates a failure to
appreciate the underlying economic considerations of the transac-
tion as well as a failure to recognize the hybrid nature of the co-
operative housing corporation. Purchase of cooperative housing is
both an investment in the first instance and, more important, an
investment laden with many of the qualities of other section 2(1) se-
curities.
When one purchases housing, whether it is a house or shares in
a cooperative housing corporation, he considers the present period
consumptive opportunities as well as the number of consumptive
periods the housing will provide in the future. The Forman deci-
sion impliedly held that purchasers of housing are either consumers
or investors. This dichotomy does not always exist. A more satisfy-
ing approach to the problem, one which does not attempt to mold
145. Id. at 98,528.
146. 421 U.S. at 851.
147. 1050 Tenants Corp. v. Jakobson, 365 F. Supp. 1171, 1176 (S.D.N.Y. 1973),
affd, 503 F.2d 1375 (2d Cir. 1974).
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cooperative shares into any restrictive category, may be found in the
careful examination of the economic realities of each transaction
that the court has invited.
148
The investment quality associated with the purchase of housing
may be stated in two extreme cases. The normal purchase of a home
is clearly not a section 2(1) investment. Since the only hope of
profits from such a purchase is tied to a general increase in values
which may occur over time, there can be no investment contract
unless the purchase is made with the understanding that a third
party planned to develop or operate the real estate for profit.
149
At the opposite end of the spectrum is the offer and sale of con-
dominiums coupled with a rental pool agreement, in which a devel-
oper or his nominee is responsible for management of the property
and distribution of profits derived from rentals. 150 This arrangement
clearly constitutes a section 2(1) security. These two forms of hous-
ing purchases may be distinguished by looking to the elements of
valuation and control as they relate to each investment. The pur-
chaser of a house can determine value by assessing the rate of re-
turn and risk without special information. Variations in expected
return do not depend upon the performance of third party fidu-
ciaries. The investment is solely within the control of the investor.
In the case of a condominium subject to a rental pool agreement,
the investor must have information about the capital structure of
the venture as well as the performance record of its promoters to
analyze its risk and rate of return characteristics. This information
is crucial because the investment is controlled by third parties
148. See notes 54 & 55 supra and accompanying text.
149. See 1 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 491-92 (2d ed. 1961). A syste-
matic plan of development by a subdivision owner would result in investment
contract treatment when subdivision parcels are sold for investment purposes. See
Long, supra note 69, at 162-63.
150. The SEC has noted that such investments may be investment contracts or
participations in a profit-sharing agreement. SEC Securities Act Release No. 5347
[1972-73 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 79,163, at 82,536 (Jan. 4, 1973).
See I L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 494 (2d ed. 1961); Clurman, Condominiums
as Securities: A Current Look, 19 N.Y.L.F. 457, 463-64 (1974). Several cases espouse
the theory that a security exists in the sale of property if the purchaser must retain
a third party to manage the property due to his lack of knowledge, equipment, or
experience. See, e.g., Continental Marketing Corp. v. SEC, 387 F.2d 466 (10th Cir.
1967), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 905 (1968); Roe v. United States, 289 F.2d 435 (5th Cir.
1961); SEC v. Orange Grove Tracts, 210 F. Supp. 81 (D. Mass. 1962).
On the other hand, mere delegation of management for the sake of convenience,
coupled with the practical ability to intervene in management, certainly cuts against a
finding that there is an investment contract. Long, Introduction to Symposium -
Interpreting the Statutory Definition of a Security: Some Pragmatic Considerations,
6 ST. MARY'S L.J. 96, 116 (1974).
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LA W REVIEW
whose management skills will be the practical determinant of the
venture's success.
When juxtaposed with the issues of valuation and control, the
hybrid nature of cooperative housing becomes apparent. The inves-
tor who initially selects a particular cooperative makes value judg-
ments not unlike those accompanying the purchase of a private
home. Yet, he is investing in a corporate entity with a complex
capital structure. Whether return flows from a durable good or a
financial asset, specialized information is required in the valuation
process. While tenant-shareholders do exercise supervisory con-
trol over the enterprise, the value of their investment is subject
to the discretionary control of management and the continued sol-
vency of the other tenant-shareholders. If enough shareholders
fail to pay their monthly assessments or if the property is managed
poorly, the investor stands to lose the value of his investment re-
gardless of hig solvency.
Recognition of this attribute of the cooperative housing corpora-
tion provides a better analytical approach because it highlights the
unstated policy factors which lie at the base of the Court's decision.
Perhaps Forman may be explained as a recognition on the part of
the Court that federal securities regulation of state-financed co-
operative housing corporations is not warranted. The Court may
have felt that federal regulation of entities organized and estab-
lished solely for the purpose of providing primary dwellings for low-
to middle-class families should be left to state regulation. The
Court perhaps recognized the traditionally local concerns involved
in providing housing for the state's less fortunate citizens. Under
this view, Jakobson and Grenader may be reconciled with Forman
because those cases were not limited to purely local concerns."'
A more precise understanding of the economic concepts involved
in this type of transaction will allow for symmetry in the law and
will not leave a more confused state after the courts have spoken
than existed before.
LAWRENCE G. MACKOWIAK
151. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, by reversing the district
court's holding in Grenader and overruling its own decision in Jakobson, has chosen
not to follow such an approach. Grenader v. Spitz, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
95,523 (2d Cir. Apr. 28, 1976). The court viewed Forman as controlling the ques-
tion of whether shares in cooperative housing corporations were entitled to the pro-
tection of the federal securities laws.
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